Enhancing Chess Skills through Blindfolded Tactics: An Experimental Study on Cognitive and Performance Gains | Chapter 8 | An Overview of Literature, Language and Education Research Vol. 7

Blindfold chess is a game where both the board and pieces are not visible to its players. The objective of the project is to explore the cognitive and performance benefits of solving blindfolded tactics compared to traditional methods and to verify the didactic usefulness of these solving tactics in young and adult people, involving an experimental and a control group in the research. A sample of 27 students (14 -30 years old) has been formed and several training sessions with blindfold tactical exercises have been organized. In three months 12 lessons were organized. Then objective measures (not subjective evaluations) of the benefits of this method have been collected by measuring two performance parameters (solving times of exercises and FIDE elo rating change after training sessions) and comparing them with their results before using this method. We analyzed the performance x blindfolding tactics interaction, in particular the correlations between the performance improvement x training interaction and the experimental cognitive path with the three steps of training interaction, compared to participants in the control group. Significant are differences in the improvement in solving tactics times, that is increasing the response speed. Significant results were also found in Rapid FIDE Elo rating improvement, that is increasing the playing force as a function of FIDE rating under vs over 1900 Elo (p >0,05) with a greater improvement for males. In the control group, the interaction is not significant (p>0,5) both in solving tactic times (with an average reduction of 30 seconds for each move) and in FIDE Elo Rating change after the training sessions. The results of this pilot study encourage us to organize a new experimental design in the future with more significant samples to prepare a detailed “Blindfolded tactics training protocol” adaptable to different playing levels of the subjects.

 

Author (s) Details

 

Giovanni Marchesich
Sicura Mente-Young Non Profit Organization, Trieste 34141, Italy.

 

Laura Tamburini
Sicura Mente-Young Non Profit Organization, Trieste 34141, Italy, Department of Life Sciences, University of Trieste, Italy and Ministry of Education and Merit, Friuli Venezia Giulia 34124, Italy.

 

Please see the book here:- https://doi.org/10.9734/bpi/aoller/v7/2979

A Theoretical Analysis of the Economics of Efficiency, Bargaining and Welfare Distribution | Chapter 1 | An Overview on Business, Management and Economics Research Vol. 8

This chapter develops a joint analysis of efficiency and distributional issues in an economy in general equilibrium with a focus on bargaining under bounded rationality. We propose evolutionary schemes representing bargaining, where each step of the bargaining process identifies who is willing to make a concession depending on the relative perceived cost of bargaining failure. Our analysis relies on evolutionary strategies based on the Nash-Harsanyi bargaining model, but we go beyond the Nash-Harsanyi model by generalizing it with ordinal preferences as well as allowing for inefficient bargaining agreements. We show that our evolutionary schemes converge to bargaining agreements under general conditions. The analysis covers the case where the bargaining agreement is inefficient as well as the case where the bargaining process converges to an efficient allocation located on the Pareto utility frontier. We show that the outcome of the bargaining process can be represented by the simple maximization of a “generalized Nash product.” We explore the implications of bargaining agreements for income distribution. Finally, we discuss our model’s insights in analyzing the performance of an economy, emphasizing the roles of preferences, decentralization, and public goods. In the presence of strong linkages between threat points and welfare distribution, the design and implementation of conflict resolution mechanisms need further investigations.

Author(s) Details:

Jean-Paul Chavas,
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA.

Mingcong Pan,
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics and Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA.

Please see the link here: https://stm.bookpi.org/AOBMER-V8/article/view/13103

A Brief Study about Rationality and Institutions | Chapter 8 | Research Aspects in Arts and Social Studies Vol. 2

 Giving up on logical reasoning is becoming commonplace in the social sciences. Arguments are made that rationality as the maximisation of self-interest is immoral and impracticable. Rational choice, however, is the paradigm that is most important for understanding human behaviour. D. Kahneman criticised the two extremes of perfect individual rationality and group or collective decision-making in his contribution to the study of human behaviour. The first is harmed by bias, whereas the second is harmed by noise. As a result, there is some sort of paradox here because group ratio- nality could not make up for individual shortcomings. To evaluate actual behaviour, it can be useful to think of rationality as an ideal type. Game theory can be used informally to apply Weber's action frame of reference or expected value maximisation. A causal relationship between the real means used and the actual achievement of the purpose is required in addition to intention.

Author(s) Details:

Jan-Erik Lane,
University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland.

Please see the link here: https://stm.bookpi.org/RAASS-V2/article/view/8308