In this chapter, it is our goal to suggest and discuss the Best Payoff Method, a new game resolution method. This is exemplified by applying the method to a pay raise voting game, which is a perfect sequential game of knowledge, without having yet formulated it, and then implementing the algorithm for its implementation. In the following examples, an incomplete knowledge game and a game with random features are considered. By formulating some conjectures and with a brief section of conclusions, we finish confronting the equilibrium concepts described in this work: Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, Nash Equilibrium, and Best Payoff Equilibrium.
Author (s) Details
Manuel Alberto M. Ferreira
Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE – IUL), ISTAR-IUL, BRU - IUL Portugal
Maria Cristina Peixoto Matos
Instituto Politécnico de Viseu (IPV), Escola Superior de Tecnologia e Gestão de Viseu (ESTGV), CI&DETS Portugal.
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